In August, you participated in a NATO workshop focused on cognitive warfare. What exactly is cognitive warfare?

A brief explanation of operational domains is in order. NATO divides operational domains into land, involving tanks, artillery, and infantry. Maritime, with ships and submarines. Air, where planes and drones operate. And space and cyberspace.

Cognitive warfare is a new domain of conflict, where the battlefield is the human brain and associated cognitive processes. The tools in this domain are malinformation, disinformation, psychological operations, propaganda, and others used to influence the thinking and decision-making of the opponent, both at the individual level as well as at the level of society.

The workshop I attended was focused on the so-called cognitive defense, which aims to protect the cognitive processes of individuals, thus preventing the aggressor from achieving their objectives.

What is the aggressor's goal?

The goals can vary and differ widely. For example, short-term goals might focus on shifting blame or creating chaos through conflicting disinformation that floods the information space. A good example of this would be the downing of flight MH17 on July 17, 2014, or the bombing of a UN humanitarian convoy in Syria on September 19, 2016. In both cases, Russia was suspected, but very soon the information space was overwhelmed with contradictory information and conspiracy theories. This distorted the perception of objective events and created the impression that objective truth could never be found.

In the long-term, the strategic goals of aggressors are strengthening their position on the international stage, destabilizing foreign states through societal polarization, and weakening international coalitions (such as the EU and NATO). Additionally, long-term strategic goals are also aimed at protecting cognitive resources. This can be achieved through propaganda, targeted censorship, or historical revisionism, preparing the population for sanctions, mobilization, or worsening living conditions following the onset of armed conflict.

One of the goals of cognitive warfare that is continually discussed within NATO is the so-called 'disruption of the enemy's decision-making processes to prevent them from making adequate and rational decisions,' along with the related strengthening of cognitive defense and the increase of cognitive resilience in armed forces.

The list of goals can vary, and the list is by no means exhaustive. However, if we were to generalize the goal of cognitive warfare, it would be the alteration of the opponent's perception of the world.

What exactly does the alteration of the opponent's perception of the world mean? And what tools does the aggressor use for this? Are they, for example, disinformation, deepfake materials, and propaganda narratives?

The alteration of the perception of the world means that the aggressor gradually changes how the target population interprets global events and the world around them. Simply put, the aggressor wants to be seen as a benevolent provider of aid and a protector of traditional values, who is unfairly targeted by corrupt foreign governments, their coalitions, and multinational corporations.

To achieve this, the aggressor uses the tools you mentioned—disinformation, deepfake technologies, and propaganda. However, one of the most effective tactics is the weaponization of global crises through strategic narratives.

A very good example is the refugee crisis of 2015-2016, during which Russia actively manipulated the perception of the crisis to destabilize the European Union. Russian disinformation campaigns employed three distinct narratives.

The first was the "guilt narrative", which blamed Europe and the U.S. for causing the refugee crisis and participating in a conspiracy to destroy European civilization. These campaigns were designed to provide a context for the uncertain population and point fingers at those responsible for the crisis.

The second was the "threat narrative", which fueled fears about Europe's lack of security, failures in law enforcement, and cover-ups of crimes. This was amplified by fabricated stories of kidnappings and rapes, spread not only by Russian state media but also by high-ranking Russian politicians.

The third was the "security narrative", which portrayed Russia as the only reliable provider of security for European citizens, claiming it was ready to intervene and protect people from rising crime and the inevitable "Islamization."

These narratives were repeated during other crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where Russia positioned itself as a benevolent provider of aid, yet claimed that its assistance was being blocked by EU countries.

How does cognitive warfare affect the human brain? What happens to our perception of the world?

Changing one's perception of the world is not as difficult as it may seem because the brain itself is highly vulnerable. The brain is like a large receiver with a very limited ability to control its own perceptual pathways. It cannot decide what it sees and hears, as there are no willpower-activated filters that can prevent the perception of external stimuli. We also cannot control the immediate reactions triggered by certain stimuli. These are natural reactions and emotions, like fear or disgust, or more complex processes like the desire for retribution. So, getting into someone's head to provoke a specific reaction isn't particularly hard.

However, the brain is most vulnerable to cognitive warfare tactics during moments of uncertainty. When people lack sufficient information and are unable to predict future events or prepare for them adequately, they are particularly susceptible. During global crises, feelings of uncertainty are heightened, and aggressors are well aware of this (hence the weaponization of crises). Individual uncertainty is often accompanied by feelings of loss of control, anxiety, and stress, leading to excessive anticipatory reactions where people overestimate the risks they face.

In these situations, the brain seeks to resolve uncertainty as quickly as possible, which often leads to simplistic explanations, such as those provided by conspiracy theories. These narratives give people a sense of control and clarity regarding global events, but in doing so, they also subtly introduce elements of the aggressor’s worldview. This manipulated worldview often portrays the aggressor as a victim and a benevolent provider of help. Thus, vulnerable individuals are fed fragments of the aggressor's perspective without realizing it.

Since when has cognitive warfare become a significant military-strategic aspect of NATO? Was there a turning point?

NATO began to focus on this domain in 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea. However, this moment was more of a turning point for NATO, as the methods of cognitive warfare had already been developed and used by the Soviet Union under the concept of Reflexive Control. This strategy was created by Soviet mathematician and psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre, with the goal of influencing and disrupting the decision-making processes of adversaries without them being aware of the manipulation.

Reflexive control was initially developed as a counter to the U.S. Game Theory, which was adapted for military purposes. However, it now serves as the foundation for modern Russian cognitive warfare. The techniques of reflexive control included distraction, information overload through providing conflicting information, division and polarization of the population, and discrediting governments.

Technically, modern cognitive warfare is nothing new; these tactics have simply reached their "golden era," largely due to the endless information channels and social media platforms that define today's communication landscape.

What actors use this dimension of warfare? Is cognitive warfare the domain of technologically advanced states, or is it also used by smaller non-state actors like terrorist organizations?

The leading players in cognitive warfare are undoubtedly major global powers like Russia and China. China describes cognitive warfare as the use of public opinion, psychological operations, and legal influence to achieve victory. Although Russia doesn't explicitly define cognitive warfare in the same way, its strategy in this domain is heavily influenced by its National Security Strategy of 2021, a document that portrays Russia as a supporter of a stable global system through international law and multilateral cooperation with the UN and its Security Council. However, it simultaneously frames Russia as a victim of foreign adversarial actions, including unfair competition and sanctions from Western states, who are driven by a pursuit of hegemony. The strategy presents a narrative of traditional Russian values being under attack from Western non-governmental organizations, religious groups, and extremist or terrorist organizations.

Russia and China lead in cognitive warfare not only because of their financial and human resources but also due to their aggressiveness in pursuing their strategic goals. However, cognitive warfare is not restricted to large state actors—it is also employed by smaller groups, including terrorist organizations.

Terrorist attacks themselves can be seen as a form of cognitive warfare, as they induce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty in civilian populations, giving the impression that governments are incapable of protecting their citizens. Terrorist groups use this domain to radicalize vulnerable individuals, often through propaganda. They create narratives that justify their actions as morally righteous, portraying the world in black-and-white and within terms of "us vs. them." A clear example is the Islamic State's success in recruiting jihadists globally, particularly in 2014-2015, when many recruits, including those from the West, joined despite having little knowledge of Islam.

Whether it's large global players or terrorist groups, the ultimate goal of cognitive warfare remains the same—changing the perception of the world.

Can we prevent these attacks on human perception? Is there any solution at the international level to prevent society from falling victim to these campaigns?

Unfortunately, I don't have an optimistic answer to this. We're facing a number of challenges. In our society, censorship of media is not an option. And we have ethical boundaries when considering any cognitive offensives against the civilian populations of adversary states. The aggressor, however, has no such issue, whether it involves their own attacks or active censorship within their territory.

In our case, there's no doctrine for cognitive deterrence, akin to nuclear deterrence. It’s difficult to imagine a scenario like: "If you attack me, I'll launch a massive leaflet campaign on your territory." So, what remains is a cognitive defense against external attacks—without resorting to censorship. This means focusing on research into how aggressors exploit the cognitive vulnerabilities of the human brain to reshape our worldviews. Based on this understanding, we can create defensive strategies to strengthen individual cognitive resilience.

Unfortunately, even during the NATO workshop I attended, we couldn’t agree on a clear definition of what cognitive defense should include. Should we prioritize defending our armed forces or focus on protecting civilians first? We also haven't reached a consensus on the methodology—should we begin with fact-checking, which some consider inadequate, or start with inoculation against disinformation? Each of these fields is vast and requires substantial research. However, this research is currently underfunded, either because the concept of cognitive warfare remains unclear or due to political obstacles.

Unfortunately, all of this is happening while foreign aggressors continue to attack us relentlessly.

What is the position of the Czech Republic compared to neighbouring countries in its ability to counter similar operations?

Recently, the Czech Republic has started taking clear steps to address cognitive operations and hybrid threats. A significant development was the establishment of the Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the Office of the Government, a role now held by Otakar Foltýn. However, it’s uncertain how, with a small team and limited budget, he will manage to strengthen the country’s cognitive resilience against massive information campaigns from foreign aggressors. On the other hand, he’s not alone in this effort. The Czech Armed Forces, especially the Information and Cyber Forces Command, play a crucial role in defending against cognitive threats and take the domain of cognitive warfare very seriously.The organization Defense and Security Innovation Hub (DefSec) organized the workshop and cognitive warfare is one of its main security themes. Additionally, civil initiatives such as Czech Elves, which focus on foreign disinformation campaigns, and institutions like BIS (the intelligence service), whose work isn’t always visible, also contribute to this defense.

Moreover, since Russia's aggression against Ukraine, there has been a growing number of grant opportunities targeting research on cognitive warfare topics.

Despite the Czech Republic's efforts to build resilience against current and future cognitive attacks, one could argue that these steps might be coming a little late. For example, for Poland and Estonia, the turning point was already in 2014. The Estonian government began investing significant resources in media literacy courses in schools and provided grants to journalists and media outlets, including those in Russian, in response to the growing disinformation targeting the large Russian-speaking minority. The Polish government regularly informs the public about its counterintelligence activities, discusses Russian disinformation narratives, and allocates resources for both debunking disinformation and pre-bunking it before it spreads. While the primary audience is Polish citizens, many of these strategic communications are also aimed at foreign audiences.

The country that appears to be the most successful in terms of resilience against cognitive warfare is Taiwan. Taiwan demonstrates strong internal resilience due to its thriving economy, an active civil society capable of rapid fact-checking, and a younger generation increasingly identifying with a Taiwanese identity. Despite differing political views, there is a high level of trust in the government's and military’s defensive efforts. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense openly announced years ago that it is facing efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to conduct cognitive warfare, which includes disinformation on social media, fake accounts, troll farms, and local collaborators. Taiwan’s military is highly active in this fight, monitoring and promptly debunking disinformation through its own accounts and websites. However, this effort wouldn't be as effective if Taiwan didn't have strong social cohesion, which seems to be one of the most powerful factors in its cognitive resilience.

We ate discussing defense against cognitive operations. Does NATO actively use such methods, or is it planning to? If not, why?

This is a bit complicated. NATO is definitely active in this field, but mostly in a defensive rather than an offensive role. If you look at NATO's articles and documents on cognitive warfare, you’ll find an emphasis on cognitive defense. NATO positions itself as a key player, but only as a supporter of its member states, not as an independent actor. NATO countries differ in their cultural, social, technological, and governmental structures, which impacts their susceptibility to cognitive attacks. NATO assists with cognitive defense, but the main responsibility lies with each specific member country.

As for active offensive operations, NATO and individual member armies certainly have tactics and strategies designed to disable or paralyze enemy decision-making. However, conducting offensive operations targeted at civilian populations in peacetime is not on the table. Cognitive warfare and other hybrid operations fall into a gray area, where the ethical boundaries are not the same for every actor. Adversaries essentially have free rein, while NATO states are bound by legal and ethical frameworks. Attacking civilian populations is simply unacceptable, and any cognitive offensives without invoking Article 5 would exceed the legal framework, provoke public disapproval, and undermine cooperation within the alliance.

What are the greatest challenges in this area in the near future?

In the near future, cognitive warfare will become an increasingly intense and complex domain, primarily due to the growth and capabilities of AI.

There are several challenges here. Lawmakers and governments will need to prepare for a rise in extremism and sabotage carried out by citizens in the name of a distorted worldview. Mental health professionals should be prepared to address increasing social frustration, uncertainty, anxiety disorders, and feelings of threat due to ongoing cognitive attacks that significantly impact well-being.

From a broader perspective, a major challenge will be building cognitive resilience at both group and societal levels through fostering social cohesion. This will be extremely difficult in a fragmented society where more people lean towards conspiracy narratives that interpret their country’s actions as false, corrupt, and manipulated by secret governments.

A crucial challenge will also be building personal cognitive defense at the individual level, through understanding one’s own cognitive vulnerabilities and developing the ability to recognize when an aggressor attempts cognitive manipulation. Pre-bunking will be essential, where individuals are warned of upcoming waves of disinformation before they even appear. We could think of this as a kind of cognitive “vaccination,” where vulnerable individuals are exposed to specific types of disinformation in advance to weaken its impact. This could be reinforced by developing individual training within psychology for monitoring and regulating one's emotional responses, which the aggressor tries to trigger and exploit.

One of the greatest challenges, in my view, is protecting individual moral reasoning. If a foreign aggressor successfully alters the perception of the world within vulnerable individuals, the aggressor can control not only their decision-making processes but also instil values to be defended at any cost. This would give the aggressor control over the individual’s moral reasoning, driving them to actively support and defend the aggressor’s actions, and potentially even engage in sabotage or terrorism. Such “mind hacking” is, in my opinion, the most dangerous form of attack and could be considered a decisive victory for the aggressor on the cognitive battlefield.

 

Mgr. Marek Havlík, Ph.D.

graduated from the Faculty of Arts at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. He completed his studies with a successful dissertation defense, in which he focused on methodological aspects of the Default mode network. He is currently a researcher at the Center for Advanced Studies of Brain and Consciousness, where he is interested in correlates and mechanisms of conscious experience, conscious contents and the issue of their entry into the stream of consciousness, meta-consciousness, unconscious precognition, predictive coding, and the study of the flip side of conscious experience, represented by self-referential thoughts and rambling.